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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-NAVARRO V. PFIZER CORPORA­
TION: Too MUCH DISREGARD AND Too LITTLE DEFERENCE IN 
DEFINING "DISABILITY" UNDER THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL 
LEAVE ACT 
INTRODUCTION 
Consider this hypothetical situation: Company, Inc. employs 
two individuals full-time with the same salary and benefits. Mr. Ri­
vera has a 20-year-old daughter, home from college for the semes­
ter recovering from a broken leg. Ms. Cho has a 35-year-old son, 
paralyzed from an accident that has left him dependent on constant 
care by home nurses. Both children contract pneumonia requiring 
a week's stay in a hospital. Both parents request time off from 
work to care for their children. The question facing their employer 
is: Are both employees entitled to unpaid leave under the Family 
and Medical Leave Act? 
The Family and Medical Leave Act of 19931 ("FMLA") allows 
eligible employees2 to take up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave to 
care for a son or daughter with a "serious health condition."3 Con­
gress defined a son or daughter as a child who is either (A) under 
eighteen years old or (B) eighteen years of age or older and incapa­
ble of self-care because of mental or physical disability.4 Because 
they are older than eighteen, Mr. Rivera's and Ms. Cho's children 
must be incapable of self-care because of a mental or physical disa­
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000). 
2. The FMLA defines an eligible employee as one who has been employed for at 
least twelve months by the employer and for at least 1250 hours of service during those 
twelve months. § 2611(2)(A). The FMLA excludes federal officers and employees who 
are covered by subchapter V of chapter 63 of Title 5, and employees whose employer 
has fewer than 50 employees. § 2611(2)(B). 
3. § 2612(1)(C). See infra Part I1LB for a discussion of the serious health condi­
tion and the difference between it and a disability. 
4. "The term son or daughter means a biological, adopted, or foster child, 
stepchild, a legal ward, or a child of a person standing in loco parentis, who is-(A) 
under 18 years of age; or (B) 18 years of age or older and incapable of self-care because 
of mental or physical disability." § 2611(12). 
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bility to qualify for coverage under the Act. Congress did not, how­
ever, define "disability" in the FMLA. Instead, it authorized the 
Secretary of Labor to promulgate the regulations.s 
Accordingly, the Secretary adopted the definition of disability 
set forth in the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"):6 an im­
pairment that substantially limits an individual's major life activi­
ties.7 However, the Secretary did not directly define these terms. 
The Secretary established their meaning by reference to the ADA 
regulations, which were promulgated by the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC").8 These ADA regulations are 
supplemented by the EEOC's Interpretive Guidance on Title I of 
the Americans with Disabilities Act ("EEOC Interpretive Gui­
dance").9 Consequently, to decide whether Mr. Rivera and Ms. 
Cho are entitled to leave, their employer must determine if either 
of their adult children has a disability as defined under the FMLA. 
However, consulting the FMLA regulations will only take the em­
ployer so far. The employer must also look to the referenced ADA 
regulations and the appended EEOC Interpretive Guidance, be­
cause the meanings of the essential terms within the FMLA defini­
tion of disability lie there. 
In Navarro v. Pfizer Corporation,lO the First Circuit Court of 
Appeals considered the meaning of disability in the context of the 
FMLA. The court reviewed the situation of a mother-employee 
whose adult daughter was bedridden for the last weeks of her preg­
nancy and determined that the daughter's condition could meet 
both the requirements of a serious health condition and incapable 
of self-care because of disability. Thus, the court held that the 
mother could be entitled to unpaid leave under the FMLA.11 In 
reaching its conclusion, the First Circuit adopted a broad interpre­
tation of disability as defined in the FMLA, allowing both Mr. Ri­
vera and Ms. Cho to take unpaid leave to care for their children in 
the hospitalP Despite each adult child's compelling situation, how­
5. § 2654. 
6. 42 U.S.c. §§ 12101-12213 (2000). 
7. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 C.F.R. § 825.113(c)(2) (2000). 
8. Regulations to Implement the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1630.2 (h), (i), (j) (2000), referenced by 29 C.F.R. § 825.113(c)(2). 
9. 29 C.F.R. Ch. XIV, app. § 1630 (2000). 
10. 261 F.3d 90, 96 (1st Cir. 2001) (stating that the question of the definition of 
disability in the FMLA was an issue of first impression for the First Circuit and no other 
Circuit Court of Appeals has addressed the issue). 
11. Id. at 104. 
12. The hospitalization due to pneumonia qualifies as a serious health condition 
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ever, Congress only intended Ms. Cho to be covered under the 
FMLA. 
This Note argues, in contrast to the First Circuit's holding, that 
the language of the FMLA requires a narrower interpretation of 
disability. The referenced ADA regulations require that a review­
ing court consider three factors in determining whether a disability 
exists, or more specifically, whether an impairment substantially 
limits an individual in a major life activity. The three factors are 
"the nature and severity of the impairment," the duration of the 
impairment, and "the long-term impact ... resulting from the im­
pairment."13 The Navarro court's interpretation of disability allows 
a reviewing court to ignore the duration factor altogether, contrary 
to the language of the regulations. This Note examines why review­
ing courts cannot ignore any of the three factors if they follow the 
language of the regulations. 
Under the correct interpretation of the FMLA, Mr. Rivera's 
daughter would not meet the definition of child because a broken 
leg does not qualify as a disability. Ms. Cho's son, on the other 
hand, would meet the definition of child under the FMLA. Ms. 
Cho's son is paralyzed and depends on constant care; therefore, he 
is disabled as defined in the referenced ADA regulations. In addi­
tion, the son's pneumonia is a serious health condition as defined in 
the FMLA regulations. Thus, only Ms. Cho is properly entitled to 
unpaid leave to care for her son. 
Part I of this Note explores the legislative history of the 
FMLA, focusing on the restrictions imposed on employees seeking 
leave to care for adult children. Part II outlines the views of the 
majority and dissent in Navarro v. Pfizer Corporation. Part III dis­
cusses why, in interpreting the FMLA, the First Circuit failed to 
accord suitable deference to the EEOC's interpretation of the 
ADA regulations. This section includes a suggested line of inquiry 
according to 29 u.s.c. § 2611(1l)(a), which defines serious health condition as "inpa­
tient care in a hospital." Id. Ms. Cho's son is incapable of self-care because of his 
physical disability (paralysis) and Mr. Rivera's daughter would also qualify because of 
her physical disability (broken leg) as defined in the First Circuit's opinion in Navarro. 
See infra Part II.A. 
13. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2). The regulations state: 
The following factors should be considered in determining whether an individ­
ual is substantially limited in a major life activity: 
(i) The nature and severity of the impairment; 
(ii) The duration or expected duration of the impairment; and 
(iii) The permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long 
term impact of or resulting from the impairment. 
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for courts to pursue .when examining terms defined by reference to 
another statute's regulations. Finally, the Note concludes by assert­
ing that the majority's incorrect interpretation of the term disability 
eliminates the restriction Congress intentionally imposed on leave 
to care for children over age eighteen. 
I. THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT OF 1993 
The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 began its legislative 
journey to law as the Parental and Disability Leave Act of 1985 
("PDA").14 Representative Patricia Schroeder of Colorado spon~ 
sored the 'PDA with the goal of providing parents with four months 
of unpaid leave to care for newborn or adopted children, and em­
ployees with up to six months of unpaid leave for their own tempo­
rary disabilities. IS In asserting the need for such an act, 
Representative Schroeder once wrote: "A national family policy 
should have three basic goals: to acknowledge the rich diversity of 
American families; to protect the family's economic well-being; and 
to provide families with flexible ways to meet their economic and 
social needs."16 In 1987, Congress changed the name ofthe PDA to 
the Family and Medical Leave ActP 
A. Evolution of the Act 
The focus of the FMLA is family;IS many politicians and com­
14. For a detailed account of the Parental and Disability Leave Act's journey to 
becoming the Family and Medical Leave Act-the first legislation signed into law by 
President Bill Clinton-see RONALD D. ELVING, CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE: How 
CONGRESS MAKES THE LAW (1995). 
15. 131 CONGo REC. E8318 (Apr. 17, 1985). 
16. Patricia Schroeder, Is There a Role for the Federal Government in Work and 
the Family?, 26 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 299, 309 (1989). 
17. H.R. 925, 100th Congo (1987). 
18. The FMLA specifically states its purpose as being "to balance the demands of 
the workplace with the needs of families, to promote the stability and economic security 
of families, and to promote national interests in preserving family integrity." The Fam­
ily and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.c. § 2601(b)(I) (2000). For detailed descriptions of 
the purpose of the FMLA and its provisions, see generally Lisa Bornstein, Inclusions 
and Exclusions in Work-Family Policy: The Public Values and Moral Code Embedded in 
the Family and Medical Leave Act, 10 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 77 (2000); Jane Rigler, 
Analysis and Understanding of the Family and Medical Leave Act of1993,45 CASE W. 
REs. L. REV. 457 (1995); Sabra Craig, Note, The Family and Medical Leave Act of1993: 
A Survey of the Act's History, Purposes, Provisions, and Social Ramifications, 44 
DRAKE L. REV. 51 (1995); Emily A. Hayes, Note, Bridging the Gap Between Work and 
Family: Accomplishing the Goals of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 42 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1507 (2001); William R. Huffman, Comment, The Family and Medical 
Leave Act of 1993 and the Current State of Employee Protection: What Type of Protec­
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menta tors have characterized the purpose of the Act as 
"preserv[ing] the American Family."19 The earliest versions of the 
FMLA only provided women with some "job-protected maternity 
leave," as well as allowing fathers to take leave.2o As Congress rec­
ognized the conflicts American workers faced between their jobs 
and families, it expanded the benefits of the FMLA. Gradually the 
FMLA evolved to allow employees to take leave to care for their 
children, spouses, and parents. Its evolution, however, took years. 
Two significant areas in which the FMLA changed were the 
number of weeks of leave provided and which family members 
would be covered under the Act.21 In its earlier versions, the 
FMLA granted employees up to sixteen weeks of unpaid leave to 
care for newborn, adopted, or seriously ill children, and up to 
twenty-four weeks of unpaid leave for the employees' own tempo­
rary disabilities.22 As the FMLA progressed through different Con­
gresses, the number of weeks granted for leave decreased.23 
Furthermore, the first versions of the FMLA introduced in the Sen­
ate and the House did not include provisions for spouses or parents, 
focusing instead on leave for employees to take care of children or 
of themselves.24 Even medical leave to care for children was 
limited. 
The original versions of the FMLA introduced in both the Sen­
ate and the House in 1985 did not include coverage for children 
over eighteen.25 The provision for adult children who were "inca­
pable of self-care because of mental or physical disability" was ad­
ded to the House version in 1986,26 and the Senate version in 
1988.27 What little there is in congressional reports about the provi­
tion Can an Employee Expect upon Taking Work Leave for Family or Medical 
Problems?, 15 MISS. C. L. REv. 97 (1994). 
19. Craig, supra note 18, at 57. 
20. 131 CONGo REc. E8318 (Apr. 17, 1985). 
21. ELVING, supra note 14, at 77. 
22. 131 CONGo REC. E8318 (Apr. 17, 1985). In all versions of the bills introduced, 
both for the PDA and the FMLA, Congress uses the term "serious health condition"; 
only in commentary is the term "temporary disabilities" used. 
23. See Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 122 S. Ct. 1155, 1164 (2002) 
(stating that the FMLA only requires twelve weeks of unpaid leave, a period chosen as 
a "result of compromise between groups with marked but divergent interests"). 
24. H.R. 2020, 99th Congo (1985); H.R. 4300, 99th Congo (1986); S. 2278, 99th 
Congo (1986); S. 249, l00th Congo (1987). 
25. Parental and Disability Leave Act of 1985, H.R. 2020, 99th Congo (1985); S. 
2278, 99th Congo (1986) ("a bill to grant employees parental and temporary medical 
leave"). 
26. H.R. 4300. 
27. Parental and Temporary Medical Leave Act of 1988, S. 2278, 99th Congo 
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sions for parents to take leave to care for adult children indicates 
that Congress contemplated circumstances where an adult child's 
condition "presents the same compelling need for parental care" as 
a minor child's condition.28 
The bill thus recognizes that in special circumstances, where a 
child has a mental or physical disability, a child's need for paren­
tal care may not end when he or she reaches eighteen years of 
age. In such circumstances, parents may continue to have an ac­
tive role in caring for the son or daughter.29 
Congress also acknowledged the reality that not all children 
achieve independence when they reach the age of eighteen:3o "The 
percentage of adults in the care of their working children or parents 
due to physical and mental disabilities is growing."31 Like minor 
children, adult children who are incapable of self-care because of 
mental or physical disabilities are vulnerable and in special need of 
their parents' time and attention. Currently, more parents are 
choosing to care for their disabled adult children at home rather 
than institutionalizing them.32 For working parents caring for these 
particular adult children, the responsibility creates tension between 
work demands and family needs that parents with self-sufficient 
(1986). The initial version of the FMLA introduced in the Senate did not include adult 
children. The bill only allowed employees to take time off for their own serious health 
condition, or the serious health condition of a minor child. During the 100th Congress, 
the FMLA was sent to the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee. While in 
Committee, one of the members, Senator Lowell Weicker of Connecticut, proposed 
that the definition of child be expanded to include over 18 years of age and incapable of 
self-care because of mental or physical disability. 134 CONGo REC. S25,643 (daily ed. 
Sept. 27, 1988) (statement of Sen. Dodd). That Senator Weicker introduced this lan­
guage is noteworthy because he has a child with Down's Syndrome. Also, while Gover­
nor of Connecticut, he was instrumental in bringing the World Special Olympics to 
Connecticut. In explaining the amendment to the FMLA, Senator Christopher Dodd 
of Connecticut stated that the amendment "would redefine or add to the definition of 
son or daughter ... a dependent child, a mentally retarded child over the age of 18 who 
was still a dependent." Id.; see also ELVING, supra note 14, at 77. 
28. H.R. REp. No. 103-8, pt. 1-3, at 34 (1993); Navarro V. Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 
90, 106 (1st Cir. 2001) ("Congress wanted to restrict leave benefits for parents to care 
for their adult children 18 and older to only those special cases where because of some 
mental or physical disability the adult child is ... especially dependent on the parent in 
the same ways minor children are typically dependent."). 
29. H.R. REP. No. 103-8, at 34. 
30. Id. 
31. S. REP. No. 103-3, at 6, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 8. 
32. Id. This trend stems in part from the fact that "removing people from a home 
environment has been shown to be costly and often detrimental to the health and well­
being of persons with mental and physical disabilities." Id. 
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adult children do not face.33 Thus, Congress granted employee-par­
ents of dependent adult children who develop serious health condi­
tions the same flexibility for work leave that the FMLA grants to 
employee-parents of minor children. 
In 1989, Congress added spouses and parents to the language 
of the FMLA.34 These provisions contain no age restrictions.35 At 
no time, however, did a version of the FMLA include grandparents, 
siblings, or other relatives.36 The final version of the law granted 
twelve weeks unpaid leave for both the care of a child, spouse, or 
parent, and for employees to manage their own temporary disabili­
ties. The legislative journey of the FMLA took eight years because 
of a lack of support from the president. Both the Senate and the 
House passed the FMLA three times, but President George H.W. 
Bush twice vetoed it. In both instances, Congress was unable to 
override the vetoes. However, after its third passage in 1993, Presi­
dent Bill Clinton signed the FMLA into law.37 
B. Implementation of the Act 
The FMLA specifically delegates authority to the Secretary of 
Labor to prescribe the regulations necessary to administer it.38 As 
required under the notice-and-comment section of the Administra­
tive Procedure Act ("APA"),39 the Secretary published a request 
for comments on issues to be addressed in drafting the regulations 
33. Id. at 9. "While preferable, independent living situations can result in in­
creased responsibilities for family members, who by necessity are also wage earners. 
Home care, while laudable, can also add to the tension between work demands and 
family needs." Id. 
34. Id. 
35. The definitions of "parent" and "spouse" do not reference age for either rela­
tive. The Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 V.S.c. § 2611(7), (13) (2000). Further­
more, in a House Report of the 103rd Congress, Congress commented that "[a]n 
employee could also take leave to care for a parent or spouse of any age" who met the 
requirement of a serious health condition. H.R. REP. No. 103-8, pt. 1-3, at 36 (1993). 
36. Grandparents or siblings who function in a parenting capacity for an em­
ployee or a child would be covered in the FMLA. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 
1993, 29 V.S.c. § 2611(7) (2000). 
37. Jane Rigler, Analysis and Understanding of the Family and Medical Leave Act 
of 1993, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 457, 459 (1995). 
38. 29 V.S.C § 2654. The Secretary designated the Wage and Hour Division of 
the Department of Labor's Employment Standards Administration as the agency re­
sponsible for administering and enforcing the FMLA. Implementation of the Family 
and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 58 Fed. Reg. 13,394 (Mar. 10,1993). 
39. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 V.S.C § 553(b)(1)-(3) (2000) (stating that 
"[g]eneral notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal Register, 
unless persons subject thereto are named and either personally served or otherwise 
have actual notice thereof in accordance with law"). 
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for the FMLA.40 With respect to defining disability, the Secretary 
posed this question to the public: "What meaning, if any, should the 
regulations give to the term 'incapable of self-care because of 
mental or physical disability'?"41 
Three months later, on June 4, 1993, the Secretary published 
interim regulations for the FMLA, along with comments as to how 
the· regulations had been formulated.42 In choosing the definition 
of disability, the Secretary had examined the Social Security Act, 
Medicare, and the ADA.43 Ultimately, the interim FMLA regula­
tions borrowed the exact language from the ADA regulations for 
the definition of disability. However, to explain the terms used in 
the definition, the Secretary referenced the appropriate ADA regu­
lations, rather then borrowing the language as she had done to de­
fine disability.44 
In addition to publishing the interim regulations, the Secretary 
made a request for additional comments before the final regula­
tions were scheduled to take effect.45 The final regulations, which 
took effect on April 6, 1995, varied little from the interim regula­
tions.46 The definition of disability remained the same, as did the 
reference to the ADA regulations.47 Appended to the ADA regu­
lations, the EEOC Interpretive Guidance serves to clarify the 
40. Implementation of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 58 Fed. Reg. 
13,394 (Mar. 10, 1993). 
41. Id. at 13,395. 
42. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993,58 Fed. Reg. 31,794, 31,799 (June 
4, 1993). 
43. Id. The commentary does not specify why the ADA's definition of disability 
was chosen over the Social Security Act's or Medicare's definition. 
44. Id. . 
45. Id. at 31,794. 
46. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 C.F.R. § 825.113(c)(2) (2000); 
see also The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 60 Fed. Reg. 2180, 2244 (Jan. 6, 
1995); The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 58 Fed. Reg. 31,794, 31,817 (June 4, 
1993). The only difference between the interim and final regulations is that the interim 
regulations reference 29 C.F.R. § 1630 and the final regulations confine the reference 
regulations to 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)-(j). In this respect, one could argue that the ADA 
definition of disability is stricter than the FMLA definition because, for instance, under 
the entire regulatory part of the ADA current illegal use of drugs cannot qualify as a 
disability whereas it could under the FMLA's restricted reference to the ADA regula­
tions. However, because the EEOC Interpretive Guidance under dispute relates to the 
specific regulations referenced in the FMLA regulations, this difference is academic. 
For a discussion of the final FMLA regulations, see generally Terry A.M. Mumford 
& George A. Norwood, Final ReguLations Under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 
1993 and Other Recent DeveLopments, SB11 ALI-ABA 151 (1996) (study outline); 
Michelle D. Bayer, Alan M. Kanter & Michael R. Shpiece, The Family and Medical 
Leave Act: The Final Regulations, 28 URB. LAW. 93 (1996). 
47. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (h)-(j) (2002). 
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meamng of "substantially limits" as defined III the ADA 
regulations.48 
The controversy in Navarro centers around this reference to 
the ADA regulations and the appended EEOC Interpretive Gui­
dance. In this interpretive guidance, the EEOC asserts that "tem­
porary, non-chronic impairments of short duration, with little or no 
long-term impact or permanent impact, are usually not disabili­
ties."49 The Navarro court accepted as legitimate the FMLA regu­
lations' reference to the ADA regulations.50 However, the question 
of what deference to accord to the EEOC Interpretive Guidance 
became one of the main issues dividing the majority and dissent and 
underlies their disparate interpretations of the term "disability." 
II. NAVARRO V. PFIZER CORPORATION 
The Navarro case reached the First Circuit on appeal from the 
district court's granting of summary judgment in favor of the defen­
dant. Plaintiff Gh;tdys Navarro-Pomares ("Ms. Navarro") worked 
for Pfizer Corporation ("Pfizer") as a full-time secretary from 1994 
through 1997.51 In October 1997, Ms. Navarro requested a "leave 
of absence" to care for her pregnant daughter;52 she intended the 
leave to extend through November and December of 1997. As is 
required under the FMLA, Ms. Navarro provided certification from 
her daughter's doctor, attesting that her daughter was bedridden for 
the final weeks of her pregnancy due to high blood pressure. Pfizer 
determined that the daughter's medical condition did not satisfy the 
requirements of the FMLA and refused to grant Ms. Navarro any 
leave.53 Nonetheless, Ms. Navarro took leave from work to care for 
her daughter. When she failed to report to work, Pfizer terminated 
Ms. Navarro, notifying her in writing on November 11, 1997.54 
Shortly thereafter, she filed suit against Pfizer.55 
48. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630 (2002) (Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Ameri­
cans with Disabilities Act). 
49. Id. at app. § 1630.2(j). 
50. Navarro-Pomares v. Pfizer Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 208, 212 (D.P.R. 2000), rev'd 
261 F.3d 90 (1st Cir. 2001). 
51. Id. at 209. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. Pfizer's Human Resources Manager had notified Ms. Navarro on Novem­
ber 6,1997, that if she did not report to work on Monday, November 9,1997, she could 
be terminated. 
55. Id.; see also The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.c. 
§ 2617(a)(2) (2000) (authorizing plaintiffs to sue in federal court). 
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In her complaint, Ms. Navarro alleged that Pfizer violated the 
FMLA by refusing to grant her leave to care for her daughter. Pfi­
zer filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that Ms. 
Navarro's daughter did not fit the definition of child as defined in 
the FMLA regulations.56 The district court concluded that accord­
ing to the FMLA regulations, Ms. Navarro's daughter "must be an 
'individual with a disability' within the scope of the ADA."57 In 
construing the ADA definition of disability, the district court con­
sidered the EEOC Interpretive Guidance.58 
Relying on the EEOC Interpretive Guidance, the district court 
concluded that the high blood pressure of Ms. Navarro's daughter 
was "a 'temporary, non-chronic impairment ... of short duration, 
with little or no long term or permanent impact."59 Consequently, 
the court held that Ms. Navarro's daughter's condition did not 
amount to a disability, and Ms. Navarro's request for leave was not 
covered under the FMLA.60 Accordingly, the district court granted 
summary judgment in favor of Pfizer. On appeal, the First Circuit 
overturned the district court's decision. 
A. First Circuit Majority 
In overturning the district court's holding, Judge Bruce Selya, 
writing for the majority, rejected the lower court's reliance on the 
EEOC Interpretive Guidance, which sets forth factors61 to be 
weighed in determining the existence of a disability.62 The majority 
engaged in a detailed analysis to determine what deference, if any, 
courts should give the EEOC Interpretive Guidance.63 In addition, 
56. Daughter is defined in § 2611(12) of the FMLA as "18 years of age or older 
and incapable of self-care because of ... disability." 29 U.S.c. § 2611(12)(B). Pfizer 
argued that because Ms. Navarro's daughter was not incapable of self-care because of a 
disability, she did not satisfy the definition of daughter. Thus, as the district court said, 
"The issue, strangely enough, is whether [Ms. Navarro's daughter] qualifies as a 'daugh­
ter' under the FMLA." Navarro, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 211. 
57. Navarro, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 212. 
58. [d. 
59. [d. at 214 (quoting The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 C.F.R. app. 
§ 1630.2(h) (2000) (Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act». 
60. [d. 
61. The factors are the severity, duration, and long-term impact of the impair­
ment. 29 c.F.R. § 1630.2U)(2)(i)-(iii) (2002) (Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act). 
62. Navarro v. Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 90, 98 (1st Cir. 2001). See supra note 47 and 
accompanying text. 
63. [d. at 99-101. 
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it considered the administrative and judicial history of the ADA.64 
Finding the administrative and judicial history of the ADA inappli­
cable to the FMLA,65 the court determined that the term disability 
had a broader meaning within the context of the FMLA than within 
the context of the ADA.66 Finally, the court constructed a three­
part rule for courts to use in determining the existence of a disabil­
ity under the FMLA.67 
Because the First Circuit was reviewing the district court's 
grant of summary judgment, the first question before the court was 
whether there existed a genuine issue of material fact. 68 The court 
had to decide whether a trier of fact could reasonably find that Ms. 
Navarro's daughter met the requirements of the FMLA. Therefore, 
to meet the requirements, the court needed to find Ms. Navarro's 
daughter incapable of self-care because of mental or physical disa­
bility, and suffering from a serious health condition.69 The court 
analyzed whether Ms. Navarro's daughter arguably had a "serious 
health condition" and was "incapable of self-care."70 The court de­
termined that the daughter easily satisfied both statutory provi­
sionsJl The majority then turned to the "nub of the case": the 
definition of disabilityJ2 
As stated earlier, the FMLA regulations define disability as an 
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activi­
ties of an individual.73 The court first evaluated the definitions of 
the terms "impairment" and "major life activity."74 In brief discus­
64. Id. at lOI. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. at 102-03. 
67. Id. at 104. 
68. Id. at 93. 
69. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.c. §§ 2611(11)-(12), 
2612(a)(I)(C) (2000). 
70. Navarro, 261 F.3d at 95-96. 
71. [d. The daughter's incapacity due to her pregnancy satisfied the requirement 
of a serious health condition; the doctor's directive that the daughter remain in bed for 
the duration of her pregnancy satisfied the requirement of being incapable of self-care. 
The court cites Pendarvis v. Xerox Corp., 3 F. Supp. 2d 53, 55-56 (D.D.C. 1998), for the 
proposition that any pregnancy-related incapacity constitutes a serious health condition. 
For discussions on the meaning of serious health condition in the FMLA, see generally 
Kelly Druten, The Family and Medical Leave Act: What Constitutes a Serious Health 
Condition?, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 183 (1997); Paula F. Wolff, What Constitutes "Serious 
Health Condition" Under § 101(11) or § 102(A) (1)(D) of the Family and Medical Leave 
Act, 169 A.L.R. FED. 369 (2001). 
72. Navarro, 261 F.3d at 96. 
73. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 C.F.R. § 825.113(c)(2) (2002). 
74. Navarro, 261 F.3d at 96-98. These terms come from the EEOC Interpretive 
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sions, the court determined that there was a genuine issue of mate~ 
rial fact over the existence of an impairment (the daughter's high 
blood pressure7S) and the impact of the impairment on a major life 
activity (the daughter's inability to care for herself or her children 
while bedridden76). Thus, the "crux" of the dispute, according to 
the majority, lay in whether the daughter's condition was arguably 
"substantially limiting."77 . 
For the majority, the district court's error lay in its reliance on 
the EEOC Interpretive Guidance: "In holding that a 'temporary 
non-chronic impairment' did not constitute a disability, the lower 
court relied entirely on an EEOC interpretive guidance ..., thereby 
implicitly if not explicitly granting Chevron deference to the 
EEOC's interpretation of its own rules."78 The court objected to 
this because it believed Chevron deference79 to the EEOC's inter­
pretations of the ADA regulations is not appropriate in the FMLA 
context.80 According to the court, for Chevron deference to apply, 
a federal statute must vest an agency with authority to promulgate 
rules with the force of law.81 However, Congress did not grant au­
thority to the EEOC to promulgate regulations pursuant to the 
FMLA; the Secretary of Labor has the sole authority to do SO.82 
Thus, the majority held that Chevron deference was unwarranted 
and that the district court erred in granting such deference to the 
Guidance for the ADA, defining disability as an impairment that substantially limits 
one or more of the major life activities. 29 C.F.R. § 825.113(c)(2). 
75. Navarro, 261 F.3d at 97 ("[T]here is at least a genuine issue of material fact as 
to whether appellant's daughter'S high blood pressure constitutes an impairment under 
the ADA."). 
76. /d. ("[T]he appellant has made a sufficient showing, for summary judgment 
purposes, on the 'major life activity' prong."). 
77. Id. 
78. Id. at 98. 
79. See infra note 126-133 and accompanying text. 
80. Id. at 99. 
81. /d. at 98. The highest level of deference a court can give an agency interpreta­
tion is Chevron deference. In Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. De! Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837 (1984), the Supreme Court created a two-prong test for courts to follow when 
reviewing an agency's construction of a statute. First, courts must determine whether 
Congress has spoken directly to the question at issue. Id. at 842. Where the statute is 
ambiguous, and the agency involved has rule-making authority from Congress under 
the statute, then courts must determine if the agency's answer is a permissible construc­
tion of the statute. Id. at 843. If the agency's construction is reasonable, then the regu­
lations "are given controlling weight." Id. at 844. Agency regulations will not merit 
Chevron deference if they are "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the stat­
ute." /d. 
82. 29 U.S.c. § 2654; Navarro, 261 FJd at 99. 
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EEOC Interpretive Guidance.83 
The majority went on to discuss what, if any, level ofdeference 
might apply to the EEOC Interpretive Guidance in the FMLA con­
text For example, under the Skidmore doctrine, the court could 
give the EEOC Interpretive Guidance persuasive force if it is "in 
harmony with the statute and the regulations."84 However, the 
court determined that the EEOC Interpretive Guidance was not 
meant to apply in the FMLA context85 and was inconsistent with 
the purpose of the FMLA.86 Therefore, the court determined that 
reviewing courts should not award any deference to the EEOC In­
terpretive Guidance in interpreting the term disability in the FMLA 
context.87 Since it owed no deference, the court determined that it 
may look elsewhere to determine the FMLA meaning of 
"disability." 
The majority outlined two primary reasons for deciding that 
the meaning of disability in the FMLA context should differ from 
its meaning in the ADA context To begin with, the concept of dis­
ability serves a "much different function in the ADA than in the 
FMLA."88 The determination of disability is essential in the ADA 
context because it establishes whether the individual qualifies for its 
statutory protections.89 In the FMLA context, however, the deter­
mination . of disability is only relevant when an employee seeks 
leave to care for an adult child; the determination is irrelevant when 
the employee requests leave to care for a minor child, a spouse, a 
parent, or him-or herself.90 Also, "the FMLA deals with lower 
levels of employer engagement and employee rewards than does 
the ADA":91 under the FMLA the maximum annual benefit is 
twelve weeks of unpaid leave, while the ADA requires reasonable 
accommodations for an indefinite period of time.92 
The court found these differences determinative in concluding 
83. Navarro, 261 F.3d at 99. 
84. Id. (citing Joy Techs., Inc. v. Sec'y of Labor, 99 F.3d 991, 996 (10th Cir. 
1996». Skidmore deference requires that courts accord a "power to persuade" to an 
agency's interpretation of a statute. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
See infra notes 117-124 and accompanying text for a discussion of Skidmore deference. 
85. Navarro, 261 F.3d at 100. 
86. Id. at 101. 
87. Id. at 104. 
88. Id. at 101. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 102. 
92. Id. 
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that disability in the FMLA context was meant to be less stringent 
than in the ADA context. For the First Circuit, this difference be­
tween ADA disability and FMLA disability should manifest itself in 
how courts balance the three factors outlined in the referenced 
ADA regulation: the severity, duration, and long-term or perma­
nent impact of the impairment.93 Whereas the ADA context may 
require that all three factors be given similar or equal considera­
tion, the FMLA context requires that the "trio of factors-particu­
larly duration-[ ] be treated somewhat differently."94 
The First Circuit constructed a tripartite rule for future deter­
minations of whether an adult child's condition meets the require­
ment of disability under the FMLA.95 First, reviewing courts 
should ignore the EEOC Interpretive Guidance.96 Second, courts 
should evaluate all relevant factors, including the three EEOC fac­
tors, on a case-by-case basis.97 Third, only the severity of the im­
pairment is indispensable to a finding of disability.98 This third 
prong is what differentiates an FMLA inquiry from an ADA in­
quiry: in the ADA context, the duration and long-term impact fac­
tors are also indispensable. 
Applying this rule, the majority concluded that there existed a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether Ms. Navarro's daugh­
ter's condition satisfied the definition of disability.99 Because the 
severity of the daughter's condition could be controlling in the anal­
ysis, the absence of the duration and long-term impact factors 
would not necessarily foreclose a trier of fact from determining that 
the daughter's impairment was substantially limiting enough to con­
stitute a disability. 
B. Judge Campbell's Dissent 
Senior Judge Levin Campbell opposed both the majority's 
analysis and its conclusion. In his dissenting opinion, he accused 
the majority of overriding the authority granted to the Secretary of 
Labor and substituting its own judicial discretion. lOo Judge Camp­
bell concluded, based on statutory construction and legislative his­
93. Id. at 103. 
94. Id. at lOI. 





100. Id. at 105 (Campbell, J., dissenting). 
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tory, that the term disability in the FMLA context has as restrictive 
a definition as it does in the ADA context. lOl In addition, he found 
that the Secretary of Labor intended to co-opt the ADA's regula­
tions and its concomitant EEOC Interpretive Guidance, as is the 
Secretary's prerogative pursuant to authority granted by 
Congress.102 
Drawing on the language of the statute and regulations, as well 
as the legislative history of the FMLA, Judge Campbell determined 
that Congress imbued the term disability with "a serious and severe 
consequence."103 He began with the words of the statute,104 "inca­
pable of self-care because of ... disability," and found that they 
"impose[d] a significant limitation upon the class of adult children 
for whose care parental leave is mandated."105 The limitation is not 
imposed on minor children, spouses, or parents. Judge Campbell 
found this added a significant burden and chastised the majority for 
ignoring or diminishing it. I06 
Furthermore, he found that the legislative history evinced Con­
gress' intent to restrict leave benefits for parents seeking to care for 
adult children.107 The leave is restricted to special cases where an 
adult child is as dependent on his or her parent as a minor child 
would be. "Congress contemplated an adult child who is especially 
dependent over some period of time on parental care for physical 
or mental reasons."I08 Judge Campbell determined that the con­
struction of the language and the legislative history led to the con­
clusion that disability was meant to have a narrow and strict 
meaning in the FMLA. 
The dissent also offered reasons why the term disability should 
be interpreted to have the same meaning in both the ADA and the 
FMLA. In referencing the ADA's regulations, the Secretary of La­
bor "construed the terms precisely in accord with the congressional 
intent one would glean from the construction of the statute and the 
Senate Report."!09 By cross-referencing the FMLA regulations 
and the ADA regulations, "the Secretary makes use of interpreta­
tions developed and being developed in another relevant on-going 
101. Id. at 108 (Campbell, J., dissenting). 
102. Id. (Campbell, J., dissenting). 
103. /d. at 107 (Campbell, J., dissenting). 
104. Id. at 105 (Campbell, J., dissenting). 
105. Id. (Campbell, J., dissenting). 
106. Id. at 105-06 (Campbell, J., dissenting). 
107. Id. at 106 (Campbell, J., dissenting). 
108. Id. at 107 (Campbell, J., dissenting). 
109. /d. (Campbell, J., dissenting). 
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regulatory scheme."110 This supported the dissent's contention, 
contrary to the majority's assumption, that the Secretary did intend 
to adopt the EEOC Interpretative Guidance of the ADA regula­
tions when she adopted the ADA's language. Also, employing the 
same interpretation of disability for both the ADA and the FMLA 
would provide good guidance for employers because they could 
rely on already established administrative and judicial history.111 
Finally, the dissent found that, even under the majority's own 
test, Ms. Navarro's daughter's condition would not meet the FMLA 
definition of disability. Though the majority's tripartite rule down­
played the significance of the duration and long-term impact fac­
tors, those factors remained relevant to the inquiry. Yet, Judge 
Campbell argued, the only way the majority could conclude that the 
daughter's condition satisfied the regulation was by giving little 
weight to the duration and long-term impact factors.112 In ignoring 
those two factors, the majority was, in essence, ignoring the lan­
guage of the regulation. Furthermore, the majority's tripartite rule 
permitted situations where the same language from the same regu­
lations could have a different meaning and result depending on 
whether a court is looking at the language in the FMLA context or 
the ADA context.113 Thus, the majority failed to engage in any of 
the "balancing" it directed other courts to follow in future cases.114 
Judge Campbell thus concluded that the majority was engaging in 
"unwonted activism" in overturning the district court's decision and 
forming a different rule for determining the existence of a disability 
in the FMLA context.115 
III. DETERMINING DEFERENCE AND DEFINING DISABILITY 
In reviewing statutory regulations, courts must first determine 
what level of deference they owe to an agency's regulations. If a 
reviewing court owes a high level of deference, then it must apply 
the regulations as written so long as they are not manifestly con­
trary to the underlying statute. If, on the other hand, the court 
owes no deference, then it may apply standard canons of interpreta­
tion to the statute. The two issues the First Circuit confronted in 
Navarro, what deference was owed the EEOC Interpretive Gui­
110. Id. at 108 (Campbell, J., dissenting). 
111. Id. (Campbell, J., dissenting). 
112. Id. (Campbell, J., dissenting). 
113. Id. at 109 (Campbell, J., dissenting). 
114. Id. at 111 (Campbell, J., dissenting). 
115. Id. at 113 (Campbell, J., dissenting). 
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dance and the appropriate definition of disability, were resolved er­
roneously. Section A will demonstrate that the First Circuit, in 
considering the EEOC Interpretive Guidance, failed to accord the 
EEOC the appropriate deference. Section B will conclude that 
standard rules of statutory interpretation and the legislative history 
of the FMLA both confirm that the term "disability" should be in­
terpreted narrowly and that courts should not be free to ignore du­
ration when weighing the factors used to define disability. 
A. The .Question of Deference 
The Navarro court's tripartite rule allows a reviewing court to 
discard the EEOC Interpretive Guidance when determining which 
impairments meet the requirements of a disability. Before replac­
ing an agency's interpretation with one of its own construction, a 
court must first determine what level of deference, if any, it owes to 
the agency's interpretation of its enabling statute and its properly­
promulgated regulations.116 In its conclusion not to grant the 
EEOC Interpretive Guidance any deference, the Navarro court ex­
amined two principal doctrines of deference, the Skidmore· stan­
dard, and the Chevron standard of deference. 
The Skidmore standard of deference was' first articulated by 
the Supreme Court in 1944. Skidmore v. Swift & Co. 117 involved an 
agency's interpretation of "working time" under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act.118 The district and appellate courts both rejected 
the agency's interpretation that "working time" included time fire­
house employees spent waiting to respond to alarms.119 In remand­
ing the case for further proceedings, the Supreme Court instructed 
the lower court to more carefully consider the soundness of the 
agency's interpretation.120 Because agency' interpretations are 
"based upon more specialized experience and broaderinvestiga­
tions and information than is likely to come to a judge in a particu­
116. For a discussion of the deference owed to administrative interpretations of 
statutes and regulations, see generally John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and 
Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 612 
(1996); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833 
(2001); Jim Rossi, Respecting Deference: Conceptualizing Skidmore Within the Architec­
ture of Chevron, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1105 (2001); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Defer­
ence to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511. . 
117. 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
118. 29 U.S.c. §§ 201-19 (2000). 
119. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 136. 
120. Id. at 140. 
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lar case,"121 judges should assign agency interpretations a "power to 
persuade" the court on the matter before it.l22 Under the Skid­
more standard, an agency's interpretation warrants consideration, 
akin to the weight of legislative history, in the court's determination 
of the meaning of a statute.u3 Nonetheless, ultimate interpretive 
authority rests with the courts under the Skidmore doctrine.124 
In 1984, the Supreme Court curtailed judicial authority to sub­
stitute its judgment for that of agencies.125 In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. 
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. ,126 the Supreme Court 
reviewed the Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA") inter­
pretation of the term "stationary source" from the Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1977,127 The specific issue before the Court was 
"whether the Court of Appeals' legal error resulted in an erroneous 
judgment on the validity of the regulations."128 The Court held that 
the EPA's definition was a "permissible construction of the statute" 
and, therefore, entitled to deference.129 
In holding that the EPA's construction of the statute was enti­
tled to deference, the Supreme Court announced a two-part test for 
determining whether an agency's interpretation of a statute de­
serves the highest level of deference.13o The first part requires the 
121. Id. at 139. 
122. With regard to how to evaluate whether an agency's interpretation deserves 
deference under the "power to persuade" standard, the Supreme Court stated: 
We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administra­
tor under this Act, while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their 
authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which 
courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a 
judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its 
consideration, the. validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and 
later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if 
lacking power to control. 
Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. 
123. Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretation Should Bind Citizens and 
the Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 13 (1990) ("[T]he agency interpretation is a substan­
tial input and counts for something, much as legislative history may count. But the 
authoritative act of interpretation remains with the court. "). 
124. Id. See also Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of 
Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452 (1989), reprinted in PETER H. 
SCHUCK, FOUNDATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 193 (1994). 
125. Kenneth A. Bamberger, Provisional Precedent: Protecting Flexibility in Ad­
ministrative Policymaking, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1272 (2002). 
126. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
127. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977). 
128. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. 
129. Id. at 866. 
130. Id. at 842-43. At least one commentator has characterized the test as a 
three-part test. The first part addresses the same issue, whether Congress has spoken 
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reviewing court to determine whether the statute is ambiguous: "If 
the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the 
court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously 
expressed intent of Congress."131 The second part requires the re­
viewing court to determine "whether the agency's [interpretation] is 
based on a permissible construction of the statute."132 Thus, under 
the Chevron doctrine, if Congress has bestowed authority on an 
agency to promulgate regulations for a particular statute, "a court 
may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for 
a reasonable interpretation ... of an agencyP3 
Skidmore and Chevron are the two seminal deference stan­
dards.134 Part One will examine the application of Chevron defer­
ence to the FMLA regulations, the referenced ADA regulations, 
and the EEOC Interpretive Guidance. Part Two will analyze the 
application of Skidmore deference to the same. Finally, Part Three 
will explore what, if any, other levels of deference courts could use 
when evaluating a situation in which an agency's regulations refer­
ence another agency's regulations.135 
directly on the issue. The second part of the test asks whether Congress has delegated 
authority to the agency to "elucidate by regulation." Finally, the court evaluates rea­
sonableness of the agency's construction. Anthony, supra note 123, at 17. 
131. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. Step one involves the reviewing court inter­
preting the statute "only so far as is necessary to determine whether there is clear and 
unambiguous congressional intent toward the precise question. The court may employ 
the 'traditional tools of statutory construction' to ascertain the existence of such an 
intent." Anthony, supra note 123, at 18. 
132. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
133. /d. at 844. "To be sustained as reasonable, the agency interpretation need 
not be the only permissible one, and if reasonable it will be upheld even though the 
court might have construed the statute differently." Anthony, supra note 123, at 27. 
134. Some courts and commentators consider Skidmore deference to be super­
seded by Chevron. See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 589 (2000) (Scalia, 
J., concurring in part and in the judgment) (stating that "Skidmore deference to author­
itative agency views is an anachronism" and Chevron put an end to that era); Eric R. 
Womack, Into the Third Era ofAdministrative Law: An Empirical Study of the Supreme 
Court's Retreat from Chevron Principles in United States v. Mead, 107 DICK L. REv. 
289, 302 (2002) (describing the debate over the validity of Skidmore deference post­
Chevron). 
However, the Supreme Court resurrected Skidmore deference in the 2000 Chris­
tensen decision. 529 U.S. at 587 (stating that interpretations of statutes contained in 
opinion letter are entitled to Skidmore deference); see infra note 149-152 and accompa­
nying text (discussing Skidmore deference). 
135. It should be noted that the Supreme Court has recognized "more than one 
variety of judicial deference." U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 237 (2000). See infra 
Part III.A.3. 
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1. Chevron Deference 
The First Circuit implicitly determined that the Secretary of 
Labor's FMLA regulations, including the definition of disability in 
section 825.1l3(c)(2),136 merited the highest level of deference 
under Chevron.137 However, the First Circuit declined to extend 
this deference to the EEOC Interpretive Guidance appended to the 
referenced ADA regulations. Under the Chevron doctrine, the 
court should have given the EEOC Interpretive Guidance Chevron 
deference. 
Congress explicitly granted the Secretary of Labor the author­
ity to promulgate rules in § 2654 of the FMLA.138 Since Congress 
did not define the term disability, thereby resulting in ambiguity, 
the Secretary had the authority to do so. Consequently, under 
Chevron, unless the Secretary's interpretation of the term disability 
is "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute"­
which it is not-then the Secretary's definition of disability must 
stand.139 There may be other, equally reasonable, interpretations of 
the term "disability." However, as long as the interpretation cho­
sen by the Secretary of Labor is not "arbitrary, capricious, or mani­
festly contrary to" the language of the FMLA, the regulations 
warrant Chevron deference. 
The majority in Navarro characterized the Secretary's defini­
tion of disability (an "impairment that substantially limits one or 
more of the major life activities of an individual") as "reasona­
ble."140 Though the majority then went on to characterize the Sec­
retary's reference to the ADA regulations for the definition of the 
136. See infra note 140 and accompanying text. 
137. The court recognized that Congress delegated authority to promulgate regu­
lations for the FMLA to the Secretary of Labor. Navarro v. Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 90, 
99 (1st Cir. 2001). Furthermore, the court found that the Secretary's definition of disa­
bility for the FMLA was reasonable. Id. at 96 (stating that the Secretary "reasonably 
concluded that a disability is an 'impairment that substantially limits one or more of the 
major life activities of an individual' "). 
138. "The Secretary of Labor shall prescribe such regulations as are neces­
sary ...." The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C § 2654 (2000). 
139. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. The First Circuit characterized the Secretary's 
definition of disability as "reasonable." Navarro, 261 F.3d at 96. Cf Ragsdale v. Wol­
verine Worldwide Corp., 535 U.S. 81,86 (2002) ("[t]he Secretary's judgment that a par­
ticular regulation fits within [the] statutory constraint [of the FMLA] must be given 
considerable weight" and invalidating the Secretary's regulations, which required em­
ployers to notify employees whether their leave time counts toward FMLA leave in 
advance of the employee taking the leave, because the regulations were manifestly con­
trary to the statute). 
140. Navarro, 261 F.3d at 96 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 825.113(c)(2) (1993». 
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terms as "abjur[ing] any independent effort," the court accepted the 
ADA regulations as controlling the inquiry for determining the ex­
istence of a disability under the FMLA.141 Thus, the First Circuit 
implicitly determined that the referenced ADA regulations were a 
reasonable interpretation of the intent of Congress with respect to 
the definition of the "disability." 
Nonetheless, the dispute over the degree of deference arises 
because the Secretary of Labor did not adopt a completely indepen­
dent definition of disability. Rather, she incorporated the ADA 
definition. However, the act of referencing itself, and thereby 
referencing the ADA regulations, also warrants Chevron deference. 
The First Circuit focused on when the EEOC Interpretive Gui- . 
dance was first written in evaluating its appropriateness in the 
FMLA context. The court determined that because the EEOC 
"never had any authority to promulgate regulations pursuant to the 
FMLA,"142 its Interpretive Guidance was not entitled to any defer­
ence.143 Focusing on the power of the EEOC and when the Inter­
pretive Guidance was issued is the incorrect frame of reference. 
Instead, the appropriate avenue of analysis should focus on the fact 
that the Interpretive Guidance already existed when the Secretary 
referenced the ADA regulations for the FMLA. 
When the Secretary published the interim regulations for the 
FMLA, they contained the reference to the ADA regulations. At 
that time, the ADA regulations included the appended EEOC In­
terpretive Guidance. After the required notice-and-comment pro­
cedures, the final FMLA regulations formalized the reference to 
the ADA regulations into a rule under the FMLA. The First Cir­
cuit stated that "[ e ]ven if the Secretary adopts certain EEOC rules 
as her own ... she does not automatically adopt the EEOC's infor­
mal interpretations of those rules."l44 To the contrary, since the 
EEOC Interpretive Guidance existed at the time the FMLA regula­
tions went through the notice-and-comment procedures, the court 
should presume that the EEOC Interpretive Guidance was incorpo­
rated in the referenced ADA regulations. Thus, Chevron deference 
is warranted to the EEOC Interpretive Guidance in the FMLA 
context for two reasons:145 first, the Secretary properly promul­
141. Id. 
142. Id. at 99. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. 
145. In the ADA context, the EEOC Interpretive Guidance may not warrant any 
deference. In Christensen v. Harris County, the Supreme Court stated that "interpret a­
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gated the FMLA regulations including the referenced ADA rules 
and interpretive guidance, as required by the APA's notice and com­
ment procedures;146 second, the referenced regulations are not an 
arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary interpretation of the 
FMLA.147 
Thus, despite the First Circuit's belief that the Secretary 
"caught the clearest way," the Secretary correctly and thoroughly 
determined that the ADA terms and definitions best effectuated 
the congressional intent, 148 and the court should have deferred to 
the Secretary's choice of definition for the term "disability." Even 
if Chevron deference was not warranted, however, the ADA regu­
lations, including the EEOC Interpretive Guidance, warrant Skid­
more deference. 
2. Skidmore Deference 
In contrast to an agency's interpretation of its enabling statute, 
an agency'f: interpretation of its own regulations is not entitled to 
Chevron deference. The Supreme Court held in Christensen v. 
tions contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of 
which lack the force of law" do not warrant Chevron deference. 529 U.S. 576, 578 
(2000); see infra note 149 (discussing the Christensen case). Furthermore, the Interpre­
tive Guidance at issue in Navarro pertains to a section of the ADA under which no 
agency has the authority to issue regulations. Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 
471, 479 (1999). The EEOC has the authority to "issue regulations to carry out the 
employment provisions in Title I of the ADA, §§ 12111-12117." Id. at 478. In Sutton, 
the Supreme Court left open the question of what deference, if any, is due to the EEOC 
Interpretive Guidance, 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630. Id. at 480; see Black v. Roadway Ex­
press, Inc., 297 F.3d 445, 449 & n.4 (6th Cir. 2000) (stating that there is no need to 
determine what deference is owed to the EEOC's Interpretive Guidance because it is 
not necessary to decide the case); see also infra note 168 (discussion the facts of Sutton). 
However, what deference is owed to the Interpretive Guidance in the ADA con­
text is not relevant to the determination of the deference owed to it in the FMLA 
context. As this Note argues, the Secretary of Labor properly promulgated the regula­
tions for the FMLA, including the reference to the ADA regulations and the appended 
EEOC Interpretive Guidance. The interim FMLA regulations were published in the 
Federal Register, as required under the notice-and-comment procedures of the APA, 
and those interim regulations also contained the reference to the ADA regulations. 
146. The Secretary's reference to the ADA regulations went through the notice 
and comment procedure with the rest of the regulations, as required by Congress. 
APA, 5 U.S.c. § 553(b) (1996) (directing agencies to publish general notice of rule­
making in the Federal Register and to provide interested parties with an opportunity to 
participate in the rule-making). For a detailed explanation of how the FMLA regula­
tions went through notice-and-comment procedures, see supra note 39 and accompany­
ing text and Part I.B. 
147. See Part III.A.l for a discussion of the Chevron standard of deference. 
148. See Part LA, .B. 
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Harris County 149 that interpretations of statutes contained in policy 
statements, opinion letters, agency manuals, and enforcement guid­
ances do not merit Chevron deference.15o Instead, they are entitled 
to Skidmore deference:151 these informal interpretations are ac­
corded respect and have the power to persuade.152 Thus, if the 
EEOC Interpretive Guidance is characterized in the FMLA context 
as a guideline appended to the referenced ADA regulations (rather 
than a rule that went through the mandated rulemaking procedures 
under the APA) , then the court should apply Skidmore deference 
to the Interpretive Guidance.153 
In Navarro, after the majority held that it did not owe Chevron 
deference to the EEOC Interpretive Guidance, the court turned to 
the Skidmore standard of deference.154 In the process, the First 
Circuit misapplied the Skidmore doctrine in determining that the 
EEOC Interpretive Guidance was unpersuasive.155 The court re­
149. 529 u.s. 576, 587 (2000). In Christensen, the Supreme Court evaluated 
whether the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA"), 29 u.s.c. § 201 (2000), pre­
cluded a state from unilaterally adopting a compensatory time policy. The Department 
of Labor asserted that the FLSA precluded the state's policy. In deciding what defer­
ence to accord the Secretary's interpretation, the Court concluded that deference was 
not warranted where the language of the statute was not ambiguous. Christensen, 529 
U.S. at 588. In the process, the Court reviewed various standards of deference. See 
generally Naaman Asir Fiola, Christensen v. Harris: Pumping Chevron For All It's 
Worth-Defining the Limits of Chevron Deference, 21 J. NAT'L ADMIN. L. JUDGES 151 
(2001). 
150. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587. 
151. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) (holding that an agency inter­
pretation of a statute had the "power to persuade" a court); see supra notes 117-124 
(discussing the facts and holding of Skidmore). 
152. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587. 
153. There are varying ways to interpret Supreme Court precedent on whether 
informal agency interpretations ever warrant Chevron deference. See Womack, supra 
note 134, at 318-19 (stating that there are at least three ways that courts have inter­
preted U.S. v. Mead, 121 S. Ct. 2164 (2001». Some courts interpret Mead as "limiting 
the scope of Chevron to formal actions" only. Id. at 318. Other courts view Mead as 
requiring them to evaluate "the adequacy of the procedural protections provided by the 
agency in issuing an interpretation." Id. at 319. The Navarro court falls into the former 
group. Id. at 330 ("The court [in Navarro] understood the Supreme Court's language in 
Mead to require little deference to informal actions even before the court began to look 
at the persuasiveness of the interpretation."). 
154. For one commentator, a court's application of Skidmore deference signals 
the overturning of the agency interpretation because the court will not accord the 
agency any deference at all. Womack, supra note 134, at 307 ("Skidmore deference, at 
least in its application to post-Chevron informal actions, appeared to mean no defer­
ence at all. "). 
155. Navarro v. Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 90, 104 (1st Cir. 2001). In reviewing the 
Navarro court's application of the Skidmore doctrine, one scholar criticized the court's 
reasoning in not granting deference to the EEOC Interpretive Guidance, stating, "[The] 
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lied upon three main arguments to support its determination that 
the EEOC Interpretive Guidance did not deserve Skidmore defer­
ence: 1) the EEOC Interpretive Guidance was not written to inter­
pret the FMLA; 2) Supreme Court precedent in ADA cases 
supports this position; and 3) the FMLA and the ADA serve differ­
ence purposes. However, all three arguments fail upon close 
scrutiny. 
The first argument asserted that the EEOC Interpretive Gui­
dance could never satisfy the Skidmore persuasion standard be­
cause it was not created to interpret FMLA regulations. The court 
determined that, since the EEOC Interpretive Guidance was writ­
ten over three years before Congress passed the FMLA, Congress 
never intended it to apply in the FMLA context.156 Furthermore, 
the majority stated that, as the only EEOC Interpretive Guidance 
to apply in the FMLA context, it is "idiosyncratic."157 Finally, the 
court pointed out that the EEOC Interpretive Guidance never went 
through notice-and-comment rulemaking in the FMLA context.158 
Even though the EEOC Interpretive Guidance was not created 
specifically for the FMLA context and was written before the exis­
tence of the FMLA, this does not defeat its relevance. The Secre­
tary of Labor specifically chose the ADA regulations to define 
disability in the FMLA context because they most accurately repre­
sented congressional intent with respect to the definition of disabil­
ity in the FMLA.159 In addition, the majority's characterization of 
the EEOC Interpretive Guidance as "idiosyncratic" is irrelevant. If 
the court accepts as legitimate rule making the reference to the 
ADA regulations16°-also written before Congress passed the 
FMLA-it follows that the EEOC Interpretive Guidance, too, is 
legitimate. Section 1630.2 is the only section of the ADA refer­
enced by the FMLA regulations, and the EEOC Interpretive Gui­
dance relates to this particular section. Furthermore, contrary to 
the court's assertion, the EEOC Interpretive Guidance's applicabil­
ity in the FMLA context did go through the notice-and-comment 
procedure.161 
circular logic of the Navarro court presupposed a result for all informal interpretations 
of statutes promulgated by agencies." Womack, supra note 134, at 331. 
156. Navarro, 261 F.3d at 99, 100. 
157. !d. at 100 ("[Ilt has little consistency with other EEOC pronouncements on 
the FMLA as the EEOC has made no such pronouncements."). 
158. Id. at 99-100. 
159. Navarro, 261 F.3d at 107 (Campbell, J., dissenting); see supra Part III.A.1. 
160. See supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
161. See Part LB. 
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The Navarro court's second argument for rejecting Skidmore 
deference took the position that no one of the three factors should 
have a "talismanic effect. "162 To support this position, the court 
cited Supreme Court precedent in ADA cases that required an indi­
vidualized assessment of the existence of a disability in the ADA 
context. Specifically, the First Circuit examined the Supreme 
Court's analysis in Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc. 163 and concluded 
that the Court's attention to the present indicative verb tense of the 
phrase "substantially limits" designates a point of reference that 
"militates against according talismanic effect to factors such as du­
ration and long-term impact."164 Because the Supreme Court com­
manded that the ADA inquiry evaluate an individual's current 
condition, the First Circuit rejected the view that all three factors 
had to be satisfied to some extent. The First Circuit argued that 
consideration of the duration and long-term impact factors requires 
a factfinder to "hypothesize" about the future condition of the 
impairment.165 
Contrary to the First Circuit's assertion, Sutton does not com­
pel the court's conclusions. In Sutton, the Supreme Court stated 
only that a reviewing court make the determination of disability 
through an "individualized inquiry"166 that "a person be pres­
ently-not potentially or hypothetically-substantially limited in 
order to demonstrate a disability."167 The context of this latter 
statement is that a court's analysis of the existence of an individ­
ual's disability considers the corrective measures taken by the indi­
vidual.168 Thus, Sutton's holding does not support the First 
Circuit's conclusion that all the enumerated factors need not be 
162. Navarro, 261 F.3d at 101. See also note 105 and accompanying text. Fur­
thermore, that the court turned to ADA precedent to evaluate the language of the 
referenced regulations demonstrates the court's deference to the ADA regulations in 
the FMLA context. Id. at 96-98, 100. 
163. 527 U.S. 471 (1999). See supra note 145 & infra note 168 (discussing Sutton). 
164. Navarro, 261 F.3d at 100-01. 
165. /d. at 101. 
166. By "individualized inquiry," the Supreme Court intends that a person's diag­
nosis of a particular condition is not the controlling factor in the determination of a 
disability. Because the same diagnosis in two individuals can nonetheless result in 
symptoms that vary widely with respect to severity and duration, a case-by-case assess­
ment of the effects of an impairment is necessary. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc., v. 
Williams, 122 S. Ct. 681, 692 (2002). 
167. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482. 
168. In Sutton, the plaintiffs argued that their severe myopia should qualify as a 
disability under the ADA in spite of the fact that their glasses corrected their vision to 
20/20 or better because the determination of a disability is made without considering 
corrective measures. Id. at 481. The Court rejected this argument and determined that 
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present.169 
Moreover, a recent Supreme Court ADA case, Toyota Motor 
Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams,no directly opposes the 
First Circuit's conclusion that the duration and long-term impact 
factors need not be present for a determination of "disability." The 
Court's holding was based on an analysis of section 1630.20)(2) of 
the ADA regulations-the section referenced by the FMLA regula­
tions. In its holding, the Court stated, "The impairment's impact 
must also be permanent or 10ng-term."171 This statement indicates 
that a court's analysis of the existence of a disability must include 
the consideration of all three factors: severity, duration, and long­
term impact. Moreover, the Court also considered the EEOC In­
terpretive Guidance in its analysis. Therefore, though each disabil­
ity inquiry is performed on a case-by-case basis because the factors 
may differ in significance from person to person, each factor-in­
cluding duration and long-term impact-should be accounted for in 
some manner. 
The last argument offered by the court contends that the dif­
ferences between the ADA and the FMLA illustrate how the 
EEOC Interpretive Guidance clashes with the underlying purpose 
of the FMLA.172 However, the majority's interpretation of the pur­
pose of the FMLA is not an accurate characterization of congres­
sional intent.173 Though the stated purpose of the FMLA is 
"preserving family integrity," the authoritative language of the stat­
ute is not so broad. Congress limited "family" in the language of 
the FMLA; some relatives who are within the ordinary usage of the 
term "family" are not included.174 For instance, an employee may 
not take time off to care for a sibling or a grandparent, although a 
seriously ill sibling or grandparent175 presents a distressing situation 
the proper disability inquiry examined the present state of the condition, including any 
corrective measures taken and their impact on the individual's condition. Id. at 482. 
169. Navarro, 261 F.3d at 101. 
170. 534 U.S. 184 (2002). The Court in Toyota Motor addressed "what a plaintiff 
must demonstrate to establish a substantial limitation in the specific major life activity 
of performing manual tasks." Id. at 196. 
171. Id. at 196. 
172. Navarro, 261 F.3d at 101. 
173. For a discussion of the majority's interpretation of the purpose of the 
FMLA, see supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text; for a discussion of the legislative 
history of the FMLA, see supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text. 
174. See supra Part I.A. 
175. Grandparents who are the primary caretakers of their grandchildren would 
qualify under the FMLA because they are fulfilling the role of the parent. H.R. Rep. 
No. 103-8, at 34 ("In choosing this definitional language, the committee intends that the 
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that seems deserving of coverage by the FMLA. 
Similarly, Congress limited the class of children who fall under 
the auspices of the FMLA. The language of the FMLA states that 
the adult child of an employee is only covered when the adult child 
has a serious health condition and is incapable of self-care because 
of mental or physical disabilityP6 In crafting the language of the 
statute, Congress intended to limit the number of adult children 
who qualify under the FMLA. The court must give effect to the 
unambiguous language of the statute,177 regardless of the stated 
purpose of the Act. 
In summary, none of the First Circuit's arguments against ac­
cording deference to the EEOC Interpretive Guidance stand; 
therefore, because the EEOC Interpretive Guidance has persuasive 
power, it warrants, at minimum, Skidmore deference. This is espe­
cially true since deference to the EEOC Interpretive Guidance of 
the ADA regulations is not simply deference to an agency that "has 
expertise in a field that bears some relation to the statute at issue," 
as the First Circuit described it.178 By referencing the ADA regula­
tions instead of incorporating its language directly into the FMLA 
regulations, the Secretary referenced the agency with expertise in 
the field. 179 Congress did not intend self-sufficient adult children 
with serious health conditions to be covered under the FMLA. In 
selecting the ADA definition to define disability in the FMLA con­
text, the Secretary of Labor chose a definition that provided the 
restrictive meaning Congress intended. Thus, even under the Skid­
more doctrine, the Navarro court should have adopted the EEOC 
Interpretive Guidance as an accurate test for determining the exis­
tence of a disability. 
3. Seminole Rock Deference 
As Congress continues to enact statutes that cover more areas 
terms "parent" and "son or daughter" be broadly construed to ensure that an employee 
who actually has day-to-day responsibility for caring for a child is entitled to leave even 
if the employee does not have a biological or legal relationship to that child."). 
176. An employee's minor child does not face this added restriction; instead a 
minor child faces the same requirement that the employee's spouse and parent face: a 
serious health condition. Navarro, 261 F.3d at 105 (Campbell, J., dissenting) ("Notably, 
the statute imposes no such disability limitation in respect to leaves to care for minor 
children, spouses and parents."). 
177. Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984); see Part 
1I1.A.1 (discussing Chevron deference). 
178. Navarro, 261 F.3d at 99. 
179. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 c.F.R. § 825.113(c)(2) (2000). 
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of employment life, there is bound to be overlap in the terms 
used.180 Where there is overlap, it is reasonable, efficient, and ef­
fective for authorized agencies to cross-reference the definitions 
and regulations of other statutes. As Judge Campbell stated in his 
dissent in Navarro: "The ... cross-reference to the ADA's defini­
tion of 'disability' with its concomitant history and administrative 
and judicial guidance makes it possible for employers, employees 
and tribunals interpreting the FMLA to refer to well-established 
coherent principles and precedent ...."181 
When an agency refers to other regulations, the referenced 
regulations should be entitled to the same deference as the agency's 
own regulations; As applied to Navarro, if the referencing regula­
tions are entitled to Chevron deference (because the FMLA was 
ambiguous with respect to the definition of disability and Secretary 
of Labor had the authority to issue regulations, which were not 
manifestly contrary to the FMLA), the referenced ADA regula­
tions would also be entitled to Chevron deference. The standard of 
deference applicable to the EEOC Interpretive Guidance, however, 
is an open question. 
Commentators have argued that Chevron deference should be 
limited to "interpretations rendered in legislative rules and binding 
adjudications."182 Thus, unless an agency's interpretation of its own 
regulations is a result of a notice-and-comment rule making proce­
dure or of a binding adjudication, the agency's interpretation would 
not be subject to Chevron deference. Because the EEOC Interpre­
tive Guidance was not initially issued as part of one of the two 
above-mentioned processes, it would not warrant Chevron defer­
ence-despite the fact that in the FMLA context the EEOC Inter­
pretive Guidance was subject to the notice-and-comment 
procedure.183 Although the First Circuit only considered Chevron 
and Skidmore deference, there are other levels of deference that 
may be applicable, as recognized by two recent Supreme Court 
cases. 
In U.S. v. Mead Corp. ,184 the Supreme Court affirmed the con­
180. See, e.g., John A. Ricca, Disability Leave Alphabet Soup: ADA, FMLA, 
CFRA and WC, 527 PLI/LIT 745 (Sept.-Oct. 1995) (discussing the overlap in coverage 
between the FMLA, the ADA, and Workers' Compensation). 
181. Navarro, 261 F.3d at 108. 
182. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 116, at 900; see also U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 
U.S. 218, 230 (2001). 
183. See supra Part III.A.1. 
184. 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
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tinuing relevance of the Skidmore standard of deference and recog­
nized that there exists a range of judicial deference.185 Mead 
encourages courts to tailor deference to the variety of statutory au­
thority that Congress intends.186 Thus, the First Circuit should have 
considered other alternatives in fashioning its deference analysis of 
the EEOC Interpretive Guidance. 
For example, the Seminole Rock standard of deference applies 
to an agency's interpretation of its own ambiguous regulations.187 
It requires that an agency's interpretation of its own ambiguous reg­
ulations should be controlling unless "plainly erroneous or inconsis­
tent with the regulation. "188 The Supreme Court recently revisited 
the issue of what deference is due to an agency's interpretation of 
its own regulations in Auer v. Robbins.189 In Auer, the Court con­
sidered whether to enforce the Secretary of Labor's interpretation 
of regulations issued by the Department of Labor for the Fair La­
bor Standards Act of 1938.190 The Court determined that the Sec­
retary's interpretation should stand191 after applying the Seminole 
Rock standard.192 Later, in Christensen v. Harris,193 the Court clar­
ified the application of this standard, stating, "Auer deference [also 
known as Seminole Rock deference] is warranted only when the 
language of the regulation is ambiguous."194 
185. Id. at 235. 
186. Id. at 238-39. 
187. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945) (stating that 
in interpreting an administrative regulation, though "the intention of Congress or the 
principles of the Constitution ... may be relevant in the first instance in choosing be­
tween various constructions ... the ultimate criterion is the administrative interpreta­
tion, which becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent 
with the regulation"); Merrill & Hickman, supra note 116, at 899 (discussing the Semi­
nole Rock standard of deference and its application to cases where courts are evaluat­
ing an agency's interpretation of its own regulations). 
188. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 116, at 899; see also Auer v. Robbins, 519 
U.S. 452,461 (1997) (stating that, when evaluating an agency's interpretation of its own 
regulation, the agency's "interpretation of it, under our jurisprudence, is controlling 
unless ... 'plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation'" (quoting Robertson v. 
Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989))). 
189. 519 U.S. 452 (1997). 
190. 29 U.S.c. §§ 201-219 (2000). 
191. Auer, 519 U.S. at 461. 
192. Id. (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332,359 
(1989) (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410,414 (1945»). 
193. 529 U.S. 576 (2000) (holding that the Department of Labor's interpretation 
in an opinion letter of the regulations for the Fair Labor Standards Act was not entitled 
to Auer [Seminole Rock] deference because the underlying regulation was not 
ambiguous). 
194. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 588. 
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Under the Seminole Rock deference standard, if a court faces 
an agency interpretation of its own regulation, the court must deter­
mine whether the regulation is ambiguous. If the regulation is un­
ambiguous, then the agency's interpretation is irrelevant, and the 
court must simply give effect to the language of the regulation. 
Thus, a court need not address or consider the agency's interpreta­
tion. However, where the regulation is ambiguous, then a court has 
reason to evaluate the agency's interpretation. 
In Navarro, the First Circuit Court confronted an agency's in­
terpretation of its own regulations: the EEOC Interpretive Gui­
dance issued for the ADA regulations. If the First Circuit 
concluded that the referenced language in the ADA regulations 
were entitled to Chevron deference-as the First Circuit Court im­
plicitly concluded-then there are only two subsequent avenues of 
analysis: either the ADA regulations were ambiguous, or they were 
not. If the regulations were not ambiguous, as the majority 
claimed,195 then the court had no reason to turn to the EEOC Inter­
pretive Guidance. As required by Seminole Rock deference, the 
court in Navarro needed only give effect to the unambiguous lan­
guage of the regulation. 
Despite concluding that the ADA regulations were unambigu­
OUS,196 the First Circuit proceeded to evaluate the EEOC Interpre­
tive Guidance. This methodology is the key flaw in the court's 
deference analysis. If the regulations were not ambiguous, then the 
court should have given effect to the clear language of the regula­
tions. Accordingly, all three of the factors, pursuant to the ADA 
regulations, should have been present in the court's analysis.197 On 
the other hand, if the ADA regulations were ambiguous, then the 
court would necessarily turn to the EEOC Interpretive Guidance. 
However, a reviewing court can disregard the EEOC Interpretive 
Guidance only if the interpretation is "plainly erroneous or incon­
sistent" with the ADA regulation. Generally, a referenced agency's 
interpretive guidance of its own regulations warrants deference in 
the context of the referencing agency's regulations. 
In conclusion, because the EEOC Interpretive Guidance went 
through notice-and-comment procedures, the First Circuit should 
have considered it a formal agency interpretation and applied 
Chevron deference. Thus, the EEOC Interpretive Guidance would 
195. Navarro v. Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 90, 103 n.7 (1st Cir. 2001). 
196. Id. 
197. See infra notes 200, 207 and accompanying text. 
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have been controlling. If, however, the EEOC Interpretive Gui­
dance could only be considered an informal interpretation, then 
under Skidmore deference, the Navarro court should have found 
the EEOC Interpretive Guidance persuasive. Finally, in the alter­
native, the First Circuit could have applied the standard of defer­
ence recognized in Seminole Rock. This doctrine of· deference 
applies specifically to agency interpretations of its own ambiguous 
regulations. Application of any of these standards of deference 
should have resulted in the Navarro court using the EEOC Inter­
pretive Guidance in its analysis and, therefore, applying all three 
factors in its determination of the existence of a disability. 
B. The Definition of Disability 
In addition to the misapplication of deference standards, the 
First Circuit disregarded additional reasons to define disability nar­
rowly under the FMLA. For an employee to qualify for unpaid 
leave to care for an adult child, the adult child must first be incapa­
ble of self-care because of physical or mental disability and also 
have a serious health condition.198 Congress intended the term disa­
bility to have a narrow and restrictive definition in order to limit to 
a small class the number of adult children who qualify under the 
FMLA provisions.199 However, the First Circuit's holding in 
Navarro frustrates Congress' intent by constructing a broad defini­
tion of disability that severely diminishes the significance of the 
term. 
Part One of this section demonstrates how, in fashioning a new 
tripartite rule under the ADA regulations for determining the exis­
tence of a disability, the First Circuit created a rule that ignores the 
plain language of the ADA's regulations. Part Two explains how 
the court's new rule significantly diminishes the impact that Con­
gress intended the word disability to have in the statute. With its 
tripartite rule, the court construes the term disability in such a man­
ner as to duplicate the meaning of other terms in the FMLA. 
1. Reading the Text of the ADA Regulations as Written 
The First Circuit's analysis to determine whether Ms. Navarro's 
daughter had a disability resulted in the court constructing a rule 
that abrogates the language of the ADA regulations. The ADA reg­
ulations list three factors that should be considered when determin­
198. 29 U.S.c. §§ 2612(a)(1)(c), 2611(12) (2000). 
199. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text. 
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ing whether an impairment substantially limits an individual in a 
major life activity: (1) "the nature and severity of the impairment," 
(2) "the duration ... of the impairment," and (3) "the permanent or 
long-term impact . . . resulting from the impairment. "200 The 
EEOC Interpretive Guidance expounds on the application of these 
three factors to determine the existence of a disability, stating that 
"temporary, non-chronic impairments of short duration, with little 
or no long-term or permanent impact, are usually not 
disabilities. "201 
The First Circuit uses the existence of the EEOC Interpretive 
Guidance as an avenue by which to refashion the ADA regulations. 
In determining that the EEOC Interpretive Guidance is not persua­
sive in the FMLA context,202 the majority concludes that all three 
factors do not have to be weighed equally: courts should assess 
whether an adult child's impairment substantially limits a major life 
activity on a case-by-case basis, balancing all three factors plus "any 
other relevant factors," with no one factor, apart from the severity 
of the impairment, being indispensable to finding that a disability 
exists for FMLA purposes.203 Thus, the majority allows the dura­
tion and long-term impact factors to be absent altogether while still 
allowing a finding of disability. 
Regardless of whether the EEOC Interpretive Guidance is ap­
plicable in the FMLA context, a court cannot fashion a test that 
contradicts an agency's regulations unless the court strikes down 
those regulations.204 The court in Navarro implicitly found the Sec­
retary's FMLA regulations to be valid. 205 Since the FMLA regula­
tions reference the ADA regulations, the ADA regulations are also 
valid. Even so, the First Circuit created and applied its balancing 
test in direct conflict with the plain language of the referenced 
ADA regulations. The language of the ADA regulations provides 
that three factors should to be considered, and uses the conjunction 
"and."206 When a regulation lists a series using the conjunction 
"and," all elements of the series are relevant to the inquiry.207 
200. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2) (2002). 
201. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630 (Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act). 
202. For a discussion of the majority's reasoning on why no deference is war­
ranted, see supra notes 78-87 and accompanying text, as well as Part 1I1.A.1, .A.2. 
203. Navarro, 261 F.3d at 104. 
204. See supra notes 126-139 and accompanying text. 
205. See supra Part I1I.A.I. 
206. See supra note 200 and accompanying text, Part III.B.I. 
207. The word "and" indicates mandatory inclusion. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW IN­
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Thus, all three factors in the ADA's regulations must be present in a 
court's determination of whether a disability exists. Otherwise, the 
court is, in effect, striking down those regulations. 
Furthermore, the First Circuit's inclusion of "other relevant 
factors" violates the standard canon of interpretation that the ex­
pression of one thing is the exclusion of others.208 The First Cir­
cuit's test requires that courts, in determining whether an 
impairment substantially limits an individual's major life activities, 
consider the three factors listed in the ADA regulations209 plus 
"any other relevant factors."210 The ADA regulations state that 
"[t]he following factors should be considered," and then proceed to 
list three factors. The explicit listing of three factors precludes 
other factors from also being considered.211 The First Circuit was 
not free to add the fourth factor, "any other relevant factors."212 
In support of its conclusion that the EEOC Interpretive Gui­
dance is not persuasive, the First Circuit also argues that Supreme 
Court jurisprudence provides that the three factors in the ADA reg­
ulations need not be given equal weight in every case.213 Specifi­
cally, the court relies on a footnote in which the Supreme Court 
states that in a multifactor weighing process, "every consideration 
need not be equally applicable to each individual case."214 The 
First Circuit's application of its own test, however, confers no 
weight to two of the three factors.215 A court may not be required 
to weigh all three factors equally, but all three factors should be 
accounted for in some fashion. 216 
The First Circuit should have applied the ADA regulations as 
they are written, considering all three factors in the determination 
TERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 80 (Philip B. Gove, ed., 3d ed. 1993) (defining "and" as 
"also at the same time"). The word "or" is disjunctive and indicates alternatives or 
optional inclusion. Id. at 1585 (defining "or" as indicating a choice between); see also 
WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, PHILIP FRICKLEY, GARRETT, LEGISLATION & STATUTORY INTER­
PRETATION 266, at 375 (Foundation Press 2000). 
208. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 207, at 375 (expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius). 
209. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)(i)-(iii) (severity of impairment, duration, and long­
term or permanent impact). 
210. Navarro v. Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 90, 104 (1st Cir. 2001). 
211. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 583 (2000) (explaining the canon 
expresio unius, and refusing its application to the statute at hand); see supra note 149 
(presenting the facts of Christensen). 
212. Navarro, 261 F.3d at 104. 
213. Id. 
214. FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 808 n.29 (1978). 
215. Navarro, 261 F.3d at 111 (Campbell, J., dissenting). 
216. ESKRIDGE & ET AL., supra note 207, at 375. 
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of a disability. When a court evaluates the ADA regulations as they 
are written, the term disability retains the restrictive ADA defini­
tion that Congress intended the term to have in the FMLA context. 
In ignoring the duration and long-term impact factors, the First Cir­
cuit deprives the term disability of its proper meaning in the 
FMLA. 
2. Reading the Term Disability Out of the Act 
Additionally, the First Circuit's interpretation reduces the de­
termination of a disability to the one factor of severity. Conse­
quently, there is no practical difference between a serious health 
condition and a disability. This result is contrary to a standard ca­
non of statutory construction directing courts to interpret a term in 
a way such that it does not duplicate other terms in the statute. 
Furthermore, the First Circuit's analysis disregards congressional 
intent as to how disability should be construed, as well as the spe­
cific purpose of the disability requirement for adult children. 
One standard canon of interpretation applies where a term has 
a well-established meaning: Congress is presumed to intend that 
meaning when it uses the term in subsequent legislation.217 In 
Toyota Motor Manufacturing, the Supreme Court reviewed the stat­
utory scheme of the ADA to determine what evidence a plaintiff 
must show in order to establish a substantial limitation in a specific 
major life activity.21s The Court reviewed the legislative history of 
the ADA and noted that the definition of disability was drawn "al­
most verbatim from the definition of 'handicapped individual' in 
the Rehabilitation Act. "219 In explaining why the definition of disa­
bility would be interpreted as the definition of "handicapped indi­
vidual," the Court stated, "... Congress' repetition of a well­
established term generally implies that Congress intended the term 
to be construed in accordance with pre-existing regulatory interpre­
tations."22o Therefore, Congress should be presumed to have in­
tended the FMLA term disability to be construed as it has been in 
the ADA. 
Furthermore, the diluted definition given to disability equates 
217. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 193-94 (2002). See 
supra note 170 for a discussion of the issues in this case. 
218. Id. at 195-96. 
219. Id. at 193; see 29 U.S.c. § 705(9)(B) (2000). 
220. Toyota Motor Mfg. 534 U.S. at 193-94 (citing Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 
624, 631 (1998); FDIC v. Phila. Gear Corp., 476 U.S. 426, 437-38 (1986); and ICC v. 
Parker, 326 U.S. 60, 65 (1945». 
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the term to serious health condition. Children over the age of eigh­
teen must suffer from a serious health condition and meet the ad­
ded requirement of being incapable of self-care because of a 
physical disability. By creating a rule that diminishes the impact of 
two of the three factors listed in the ADA regulations-the regula­
tions referenced by the FMLA regulation-the majority removed 
the effect of the second requirement imposed on adult children. To 
qualify as a serious health condition, a child's physical or mental 
condition must be an illness, injury, or impairment that rises to the 
minimum level of requiring "continuing treatment by a health care 
provider."221 With only severity to consider, courts may find that 
an adult child's impairment that meets the definition of serious 
health condition might also meet the definition of disability. Con­
sequently, the term disability no longer has independent signifi­
cance because a severe health condition may also provide the 
severity factor necessary for an impairment to be considered a disa­
bility. Thus, the First Circuit violated a standard canon of construc­
tion by interpreting the term disability in a manner that duplicates 
the meaning of another term in the statute-specifically, serious 
health condition.222 
The First Circuit justified this interpretation by arguing that 
since not all serious health conditions would satisfy the severity re­
quirement, the definition of disability still retained meaningful con­
sequences in the FMLA.223 It is possible that some adult children's 
serious health conditions may not be found to have a character se­
vere enough to satisfy the definition of disability. However, the 
First Circuit's interpretation and subsequent application of the term 
disability blurs the difference between the requirement of having a 
serious health condition and being incapable of self-care because of 
disability. Courts generally interpret statutory terms so that each 
term "adds something to the [statute's] regulatory impact."224 In 
Navarro, the First Circuit interprets disability in a manner that 
221. 29 c.F.R. § 825.114(a)(2). Normal maladies, such as colds and earaches, do 
not satisfy the definition of serious health condition. § 825.114(c). 
222. This canon is known as the rule against surplusage. Babbitt v. Sweet Home 
Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 697-98 (1995); Navarro, 261 F.3d at 
106 (Campbell, J., dissenting) (quoting Mass. Ass'n of Health Maint. Orgs. v. Ruthardt, 
194 F.3d 176, 181 (1st Cir. 1999) ("All words and provisions of a statute are intended to 
have meaning and are to be given effect, and no construction should be adopted which 
would render statutory words or phrases meaningless, redundant or superfluous."». 
223. Navarro, 261 F.3d 90, 103 (1st Cir. 2001). 
224. ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 207, at 266; Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 697­
98. 
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barely narrows the class of adult children who have serious health 
conditions. 
Finally, the structure of the statute indicates that Congress in­
tended the descriptive phrase "incapable of self-care because of 
physical disability" as a precursor to the "serious health condition." 
Whether an employee can take time off to care for an individual 
with a serious health condition depends on the relationship that ex­
ists between the employee and the individual. If the individual is a 
parent or a spouse, then the employee qualifies for leave. If the 
individual is a child, however, a reviewing court must first deter­
mine if the individual fits the FMLA definition of child. 
The disability requirement is definitional: if the individual in 
question is an adult child, he or she must first be "incapable of self­
care because of physical disability." Only after a reviewing court 
has determined that the individual meets this definition can the 
court consider whether the child has a serious health condition. As 
the relationship of parent, spouse, or minor child exists before the 
onset of the serious health condition, so must the adult child's inca­
pacity exist before the onset of a serious health condition. Thus, 
the adult child's disability cannot be the same as the adult child's 
serious health condition without vitiating the added requirement 
for adult children. For these reasons, the First Circuit's interpreta­
tion of the term disability does not effectuate Congress' intent. 
CONCLUSION 
In crafting the FMLA, Congress included the term disability 
but did not explicitly define it. Instead, it empowered the Secretary 
of Labor to promulgate regulations for the statute. The Secretary, 
pursuant to this authority, properly promulgated regulations which 
borrowed the definition of disability from the ADA regulations 
and, for further clarification of the definition's key terms, refer­
enced the ADA regulations and the EEOC Interpretive Guidance. 
The plain language of the regulations clearly requires a more re­
strictive definition of disability than that set forth by the Navarro 
court. Furthermore, Congress' intent, as ascertained through ca­
nons of statutory construction and an examination of legislative his­
tory, also requires a more narrow meaning. 
The First Circuit should have given Chevron deference to the 
EEOC Interpretive Guidance because the FMLA regulation's ref­
erence to it went through the requisite APA notice-and-comment 
procedures. Even if Chevron deference was not warranted, the 
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court should have given deference to the EEOC Interpretive Gui­
dance under either Skidmore or Seminole Rock. This issue of ac­
cording deference is critical because the essential difference 
between the majority's and dissent's definition of disability hinged 
upon the majority's disregard of the EEOC Interpretive Guidance. 
In disregarding the EEOC Interpretive Guidance, the First 
Circuit created its own rule for determining the existence of a disa­
bility in the FMLA context. The court's rule adds the fourth factor, 
"any other relevant factors," to the three factors enumerated in the 
regulations.225 The court also directs lower courts that only the se­
verity factor is conclusive in determining whether a particular im­
pairment rises to the level of disability,226 making the duration and 
long-term impact factors dispensable. It is this approach that ulti­
mately distorts the meaning of disability in the context of the 
FMLA. It is, after all, the duration of the children's impairments 
that separates the circumstances facing Ms. Cho from those facing 
Mr. Rivera. In time, Mr. Rivera's daughter will recover from her 
broken leg; Ms. Cho's son, however, is dependent on care for the 
rest of his life. Duration and long-term impact, essential in the de­
termination of disability in the ADA context, are essential in the 
FMLA context as well. 
Jennifer Hotchkiss Kaplan 
225. Navarro v. Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 90, 104 (2001); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2U)(2) 
(listing nature and severity, duration, and long-term impact as the three factors to 
consider). 
226. Id. 
